/lib/core_ext/fix-overtrusting_in_non_standard_http_header.rb
https://bitbucket.org/gibwar/moebooru · Ruby · 134 lines · 95 code · 18 blank · 21 comment · 7 complexity · 8b9e63a4bfcfb8c46dae55db12c7e14a MD5 · raw file
- # This monkeypatch is stolen from Rails 4.0 because the one in 3.2 is too
- # crappy that it sometimes returns invalid ip address (mainly from
- # X-Forwarded-For).
- # Reference: https://bitbucket.org/edogawaconan/moebooru/issue/113
- module ActionDispatch
- class RemoteIp
- class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError ; end
- # IP addresses that are "trusted proxies" that can be stripped from
- # the comma-delimited list in the X-Forwarded-For header. See also:
- # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv4_address_spaces
- # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv6_addresses.
- remove_const :TRUSTED_PROXIES
- TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{
- ^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost
- ^::1$ |
- ^(10 | # private IP 10.x.x.x
- 172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]) | # private IP in the range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
- 192\.168 | # private IP 192.168.x.x
- fc00:: # private IP fc00
- )\.
- }x
- attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies
- def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, custom_proxies = nil)
- @app = app
- @check_ip = check_ip_spoofing
- @proxies = case custom_proxies
- when Regexp
- custom_proxies
- when nil
- TRUSTED_PROXIES
- else
- Regexp.union(TRUSTED_PROXIES, custom_proxies)
- end
- end
- def call(env)
- env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = GetIp.new(env, self)
- @app.call(env)
- end
- class GetIp
- # IP v4 and v6 (with compression) validation regexp
- # https://gist.github.com/1289635
- VALID_IP = %r{
- (^(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[0-9]{1,2})(\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[0-9]{1,2})){3}$) | # ip v4
- (^(
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){7}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 not abbreviated
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){6}:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with double colon in the end
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){5}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:)?[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - ip addresses v6
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){4}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - with
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){3}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - double colon
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){2}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - in the middle
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){6} ((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3} (\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1,5}:((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,5}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d) |(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- ([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,5}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4
- (::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,6}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with double colon at the begining
- (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1,7}:) # ip v6 without ending
- )$)
- }x
- def initialize(env, middleware)
- @env = env
- @middleware = middleware
- @calculated_ip = false
- end
- # Determines originating IP address. REMOTE_ADDR is the standard
- # but will be wrong if the user is behind a proxy. Proxies will set
- # HTTP_CLIENT_IP and/or HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR, so we prioritize those.
- # HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR may be a comma-delimited list in the case of
- # multiple chained proxies. The first address which is in this list
- # if it's not a known proxy will be the originating IP.
- # Format of HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR:
- # client_ip, proxy_ip1, proxy_ip2...
- # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X-Forwarded-For
- def calculate_ip
- client_ip = @env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP']
- forwarded_ip = ips_from('HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR').first
- remote_addrs = ips_from('REMOTE_ADDR')
- check_ip = client_ip && @middleware.check_ip
- if check_ip && forwarded_ip != client_ip
- # We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
- raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?!" \
- "HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect}" \
- "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}"
- end
- client_ips = remove_proxies [client_ip, forwarded_ip, remote_addrs].flatten
- if client_ips.present?
- client_ips.first
- else
- # If there is no client ip we can return first valid proxy ip from REMOTE_ADDR
- remote_addrs.find { |ip| valid_ip? ip }
- end
- end
- def to_s
- return @ip if @calculated_ip
- @calculated_ip = true
- @ip = calculate_ip
- end
- private
- def ips_from(header)
- @env[header] ? @env[header].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : []
- end
- def valid_ip?(ip)
- ip =~ VALID_IP
- end
- def not_a_proxy?(ip)
- ip !~ @middleware.proxies
- end
- def remove_proxies(ips)
- ips.select { |ip| valid_ip?(ip) && not_a_proxy?(ip) }
- end
- end
- end
- end