/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
C | 2570 lines | 1701 code | 327 blank | 542 comment | 323 complexity | 0e467036f18b835589b1a5af750a00a8 MD5 | raw file
Possible License(s): AGPL-3.0
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- /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
- *
- * auth.c
- * Routines to handle network authentication
- *
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2014, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
- * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
- *
- *
- * IDENTIFICATION
- * src/backend/libpq/auth.c
- *
- *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #include "postgres.h"
- #include <sys/param.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
- #include <netinet/in.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include "libpq/auth.h"
- #include "libpq/crypt.h"
- #include "libpq/ip.h"
- #include "libpq/libpq.h"
- #include "libpq/pqformat.h"
- #include "libpq/md5.h"
- #include "miscadmin.h"
- #include "replication/walsender.h"
- #include "storage/ipc.h"
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Global authentication functions
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
- static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail);
- static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
- static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port, char **logdetail);
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Ident authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- /* Max size of username ident server can return */
- #define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
- /* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
- #define IDENT_PORT 113
- static int ident_inet(hbaPort *port);
- #ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
- static int auth_peer(hbaPort *port);
- #endif
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * PAM authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
- #include <pam/pam_appl.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
- #include <security/pam_appl.h>
- #endif
- #define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */
- static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
- static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
- struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr);
- static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
- &pam_passwd_conv_proc,
- NULL
- };
- static char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 brokenness */
- static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
- * pam_passwd_conv_proc */
- #endif /* USE_PAM */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * LDAP authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef USE_LDAP
- #ifndef WIN32
- /* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
- #define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
- #include <ldap.h>
- #else
- #include <winldap.h>
- /* Correct header from the Platform SDK */
- typedef
- ULONG (*__ldap_start_tls_sA) (
- IN PLDAP ExternalHandle,
- OUT PULONG ServerReturnValue,
- OUT LDAPMessage **result,
- IN PLDAPControlA * ServerControls,
- IN PLDAPControlA * ClientControls
- );
- #endif
- static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
- #endif /* USE_LDAP */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Cert authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- static int CheckCertAuth(Port *port);
- #endif
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
- bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * GSSAPI Authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- #if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
- #include <gssapi.h>
- #else
- #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
- #endif
- static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
- #endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * SSPI Authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
- typedef SECURITY_STATUS
- (WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (
- PCtxtHandle, void **);
- static int pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
- #endif
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * RADIUS Authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #endif
- static int CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
- /*
- * Maximum accepted size of GSS and SSPI authentication tokens.
- *
- * Kerberos tickets are usually quite small, but the TGTs issued by Windows
- * domain controllers include an authorization field known as the Privilege
- * Attribute Certificate (PAC), which contains the user's Windows permissions
- * (group memberships etc.). The PAC is copied into all tickets obtained on
- * the basis of this TGT (even those issued by Unix realms which the Windows
- * realm trusts), and can be several kB in size. The maximum token size
- * accepted by Windows systems is determined by the MaxAuthToken Windows
- * registry setting. Microsoft recommends that it is not set higher than
- * 65535 bytes, so that seems like a reasonable limit for us as well.
- */
- #define PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH 65535
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Global authentication functions
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- /*
- * This hook allows plugins to get control following client authentication,
- * but before the user has been informed about the results. It could be used
- * to record login events, insert a delay after failed authentication, etc.
- */
- ClientAuthentication_hook_type ClientAuthentication_hook = NULL;
- /*
- * Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
- *
- * There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
- * unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
- * want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
- * But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
- * in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
- * anyway.
- * Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
- * postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys. In
- * particular, if logdetail isn't NULL, we send that string to the log.
- */
- static void
- auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail)
- {
- const char *errstr;
- char *cdetail;
- int errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION;
- /*
- * If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
- * trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
- * the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
- * desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
- * unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
- * send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
- * password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
- * events.)
- */
- if (status == STATUS_EOF)
- proc_exit(0);
- switch (port->hba->auth_method)
- {
- case uaReject:
- case uaImplicitReject:
- errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
- break;
- case uaTrust:
- errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaIdent:
- errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaPeer:
- errstr = gettext_noop("Peer authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaPassword:
- case uaMD5:
- errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- /* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
- errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
- break;
- case uaGSS:
- errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaSSPI:
- errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaPAM:
- errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaLDAP:
- errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaCert:
- errstr = gettext_noop("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- case uaRADIUS:
- errstr = gettext_noop("RADIUS authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
- break;
- default:
- errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
- break;
- }
- cdetail = psprintf(_("Connection matched pg_hba.conf line %d: \"%s\""),
- port->hba->linenumber, port->hba->rawline);
- if (logdetail)
- logdetail = psprintf("%s\n%s", logdetail, cdetail);
- else
- logdetail = cdetail;
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(errcode_return),
- errmsg(errstr, port->user_name),
- logdetail ? errdetail_log("%s", logdetail) : 0));
- /* doesn't return */
- }
- /*
- * Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
- * function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
- */
- void
- ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
- {
- int status = STATUS_ERROR;
- char *logdetail = NULL;
- /*
- * Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
- * combination. Note: we do not parse the file at this point; this has
- * already been done elsewhere. hba.c dropped an error message into the
- * server logfile if parsing the hba config file failed.
- */
- hba_getauthmethod(port);
- /*
- * Enable immediate response to SIGTERM/SIGINT/timeout interrupts. (We
- * don't want this during hba_getauthmethod() because it might have to do
- * database access, eg for role membership checks.)
- */
- ImmediateInterruptOK = true;
- /* And don't forget to detect one that already arrived */
- CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
- /*
- * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the
- * current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba
- * options field that should be done *before* the authentication here.
- */
- if (port->hba->clientcert)
- {
- /*
- * When we parse pg_hba.conf, we have already made sure that we have
- * been able to load a certificate store. Thus, if a certificate is
- * present on the client, it has been verified against our root
- * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
- * already if it didn't verify ok.
- */
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- if (!port->peer)
- {
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
- }
- #else
- /*
- * hba.c makes sure hba->clientcert can't be set unless OpenSSL is
- * present.
- */
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- }
- /*
- * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
- */
- switch (port->hba->auth_method)
- {
- case uaReject:
- /*
- * An explicit "reject" entry in pg_hba.conf. This report exposes
- * the fact that there's an explicit reject entry, which is
- * perhaps not so desirable from a security standpoint; but the
- * message for an implicit reject could confuse the DBA a lot when
- * the true situation is a match to an explicit reject. And we
- * don't want to change the message for an implicit reject. As
- * noted below, the additional information shown here doesn't
- * expose anything not known to an attacker.
- */
- {
- char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
- pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
- hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
- NULL, 0,
- NI_NUMERICHOST);
- if (am_walsender)
- {
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
- #else
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\"",
- hostinfo, port->user_name)));
- #endif
- }
- else
- {
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->database_name,
- port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
- #else
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->database_name)));
- #endif
- }
- break;
- }
- case uaImplicitReject:
- /*
- * No matching entry, so tell the user we fell through.
- *
- * NOTE: the extra info reported here is not a security breach,
- * because all that info is known at the frontend and must be
- * assumed known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less
- * clueful good guys.
- */
- {
- char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
- pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
- hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
- NULL, 0,
- NI_NUMERICHOST);
- #define HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port) \
- (port->remote_hostname ? \
- (port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1 ? \
- errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup matches.", \
- port->remote_hostname) : \
- port->remote_hostname_resolv == 0 ? \
- errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup not checked.", \
- port->remote_hostname) : \
- port->remote_hostname_resolv == -1 ? \
- errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup does not match.", \
- port->remote_hostname) : \
- port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
- errdetail_log("Could not translate client host name \"%s\" to IP address: %s.", \
- port->remote_hostname, \
- gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
- 0) \
- : (port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
- errdetail_log("Could not resolve client IP address to a host name: %s.", \
- gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
- 0))
- if (am_walsender)
- {
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off")),
- HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
- #else
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\"",
- hostinfo, port->user_name),
- HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
- #endif
- }
- else
- {
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->database_name,
- port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off")),
- HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
- #else
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
- hostinfo, port->user_name,
- port->database_name),
- HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
- #endif
- }
- break;
- }
- case uaGSS:
- #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS);
- status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- break;
- case uaSSPI:
- #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI);
- status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- break;
- case uaPeer:
- #ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
- status = auth_peer(port);
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- break;
- case uaIdent:
- status = ident_inet(port);
- break;
- case uaMD5:
- if (Db_user_namespace)
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
- errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled")));
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port, &logdetail);
- break;
- case uaPassword:
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
- status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port, &logdetail);
- break;
- case uaPAM:
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif /* USE_PAM */
- break;
- case uaLDAP:
- #ifdef USE_LDAP
- status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- break;
- case uaCert:
- #ifdef USE_SSL
- status = CheckCertAuth(port);
- #else
- Assert(false);
- #endif
- break;
- case uaRADIUS:
- status = CheckRADIUSAuth(port);
- break;
- case uaTrust:
- status = STATUS_OK;
- break;
- }
- if (ClientAuthentication_hook)
- (*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status);
- if (status == STATUS_OK)
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
- else
- auth_failed(port, status, logdetail);
- /* Done with authentication, so we should turn off immediate interrupts */
- ImmediateInterruptOK = false;
- }
- /*
- * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
- */
- static void
- sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
- {
- StringInfoData buf;
- pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
- pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
- /* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
- if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
- pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
- #if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
- /*
- * Add the authentication data for the next step of the GSSAPI or SSPI
- * negotiation.
- */
- else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT)
- {
- if (port->gss->outbuf.length > 0)
- {
- elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS token of length %u",
- (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
- pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
- }
- }
- #endif
- pq_endmessage(&buf);
- /*
- * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
- * not be sent until we are ready for queries.
- */
- if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
- pq_flush();
- }
- /*
- * Collect password response packet from frontend.
- *
- * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
- */
- static char *
- recv_password_packet(Port *port)
- {
- StringInfoData buf;
- if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
- {
- /* Expect 'p' message type */
- int mtype;
- mtype = pq_getbyte();
- if (mtype != 'p')
- {
- /*
- * If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
- * don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
- * fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
- * log.
- */
- if (mtype != EOF)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
- mtype)));
- return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
- if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
- return NULL; /* EOF */
- }
- initStringInfo(&buf);
- if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
- {
- /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
- pfree(buf.data);
- return NULL;
- }
- /*
- * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
- * contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
- * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
- */
- if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
- /* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
- ereport(DEBUG5,
- (errmsg("received password packet")));
- /*
- * Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
- * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
- * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
- */
- return buf.data;
- }
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * MD5 authentication
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- /*
- * Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
- * Get the response and check it.
- * On error, optionally store a detail string at *logdetail.
- */
- static int
- recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port, char **logdetail)
- {
- char *passwd;
- int result;
- passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
- if (passwd == NULL)
- return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
- result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd, logdetail);
- pfree(passwd);
- return result;
- }
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * GSSAPI authentication system
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
- #if defined(WIN32) && !defined(WIN32_ONLY_COMPILER)
- /*
- * MIT Kerberos GSSAPI DLL doesn't properly export the symbols for MingW
- * that contain the OIDs required. Redefine here, values copied
- * from src/athena/auth/krb5/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_generic.c
- */
- static const gss_OID_desc GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc =
- {10, (void *) "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x01\x02"};
- static GSS_DLLIMP gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME = &GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc;
- #endif
- static void
- pg_GSS_error(int severity, char *errmsg, OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc gmsg;
- OM_uint32 lmin_s,
- msg_ctx;
- char msg_major[128],
- msg_minor[128];
- /* Fetch major status message */
- msg_ctx = 0;
- gss_display_status(&lmin_s, maj_stat, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
- GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
- strlcpy(msg_major, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_major));
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
- if (msg_ctx)
- /*
- * More than one message available. XXX: Should we loop and read all
- * messages? (same below)
- */
- ereport(WARNING,
- (errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS error report")));
- /* Fetch mechanism minor status message */
- msg_ctx = 0;
- gss_display_status(&lmin_s, min_stat, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
- GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
- strlcpy(msg_minor, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_minor));
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
- if (msg_ctx)
- ereport(WARNING,
- (errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS minor error report")));
- /*
- * errmsg_internal, since translation of the first part must be done
- * before calling this function anyway.
- */
- ereport(severity,
- (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
- errdetail_internal("%s: %s", msg_major, msg_minor)));
- }
- static int
- pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
- {
- OM_uint32 maj_stat,
- min_stat,
- lmin_s,
- gflags;
- int mtype;
- int ret;
- StringInfoData buf;
- gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
- /*
- * GSS auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
- * relies on the overall message length word to determine the GSS payload
- * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
- * is, in fact, a design error in our GSS support, because protocol
- * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
- * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
- */
- if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("GSSAPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
- if (pg_krb_server_keyfile && strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) > 0)
- {
- /*
- * Set default Kerberos keytab file for the Krb5 mechanism.
- *
- * setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 0); except setenv()
- * not always available.
- */
- if (getenv("KRB5_KTNAME") == NULL)
- {
- size_t kt_len = strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) + 14;
- char *kt_path = malloc(kt_len);
- if (!kt_path)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("out of memory")));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- snprintf(kt_path, kt_len, "KRB5_KTNAME=%s", pg_krb_server_keyfile);
- putenv(kt_path);
- }
- }
- /*
- * We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
- * increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
- * for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
- * any vector of attack.
- */
- port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- /*
- * Initialize sequence with an empty context
- */
- port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- /*
- * Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
- * multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
- * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
- * (type 'p').
- */
- do
- {
- mtype = pq_getbyte();
- if (mtype != 'p')
- {
- /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
- if (mtype != EOF)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
- mtype)));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /* Get the actual GSS token */
- initStringInfo(&buf);
- if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
- {
- /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
- pfree(buf.data);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
- gbuf.length = buf.len;
- gbuf.value = buf.data;
- elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received GSS token of length %u",
- (unsigned int) gbuf.length);
- maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(
- &min_stat,
- &port->gss->ctx,
- port->gss->cred,
- &gbuf,
- GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
- &port->gss->name,
- NULL,
- &port->gss->outbuf,
- &gflags,
- NULL,
- NULL);
- /* gbuf no longer used */
- pfree(buf.data);
- elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %d, "
- "minor: %d, outlen: %u, outflags: %x",
- maj_stat, min_stat,
- (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);
- if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
- {
- /*
- * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
- */
- elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u",
- (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
- }
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
- {
- gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
- gettext_noop("accepting GSS security context failed"),
- maj_stat, min_stat);
- }
- if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
- elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");
- } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- {
- /*
- * Release service principal credentials
- */
- gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
- }
- /*
- * GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that authentication is now complete.
- *
- * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
- * username that was specified for the connection.
- */
- maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
- gettext_noop("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
- maj_stat, min_stat);
- /*
- * Split the username at the realm separator
- */
- if (strchr(gbuf.value, '@'))
- {
- char *cp = strchr(gbuf.value, '@');
- /*
- * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is
- * passed to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the
- * realm. Then advance past the separator to check the realm.
- */
- if (!port->hba->include_realm)
- *cp = '\0';
- cp++;
- if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
- {
- /*
- * Match the realm part of the name first
- */
- if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
- ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
- else
- ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
- if (ret)
- {
- /* GSS realm does not match */
- elog(DEBUG2,
- "GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
- cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- }
- }
- else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
- {
- elog(DEBUG2,
- "GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, gbuf.value,
- pg_krb_caseins_users);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
- return ret;
- }
- #endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * SSPI authentication system
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
- static void
- pg_SSPI_error(int severity, const char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
- {
- char sysmsg[256];
- if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, r, 0,
- sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
- ereport(severity,
- (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
- errdetail_internal("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
- else
- ereport(severity,
- (errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
- errdetail_internal("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
- }
- static int
- pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
- {
- int mtype;
- StringInfoData buf;
- SECURITY_STATUS r;
- CredHandle sspicred;
- CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
- newctx;
- TimeStamp expiry;
- ULONG contextattr;
- SecBufferDesc inbuf;
- SecBufferDesc outbuf;
- SecBuffer OutBuffers[1];
- SecBuffer InBuffers[1];
- HANDLE token;
- TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
- DWORD retlen;
- char accountname[MAXPGPATH];
- char domainname[MAXPGPATH];
- DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
- DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
- SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
- HMODULE secur32;
- QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;
- /*
- * SSPI auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
- * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SSPI payload
- * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
- * is, in fact, a design error in our SSPI support, because protocol
- * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
- * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
- */
- if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
- ereport(FATAL,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("SSPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
- /*
- * Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
- */
- r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
- "negotiate",
- SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- &sspicred,
- &expiry);
- if (r != SEC_E_OK)
- pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r);
- /*
- * Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
- * multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
- * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
- * (type 'p').
- */
- do
- {
- mtype = pq_getbyte();
- if (mtype != 'p')
- {
- /* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
- if (mtype != EOF)
- ereport(COMMERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
- errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
- mtype)));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /* Get the actual SSPI token */
- initStringInfo(&buf);
- if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
- {
- /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
- pfree(buf.data);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /* Map to SSPI style buffer */
- inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
- inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
- inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
- InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
- InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
- InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
- /* Prepare output buffer */
- OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
- OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
- OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
- outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
- outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
- outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
- elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SSPI token of length %u",
- (unsigned int) buf.len);
- r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
- sspictx,
- &inbuf,
- ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
- SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
- &newctx,
- &outbuf,
- &contextattr,
- NULL);
- /* input buffer no longer used */
- pfree(buf.data);
- if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
- {
- /*
- * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
- */
- elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
- (unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
- port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
- port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
- sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
- FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
- }
- if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
- {
- if (sspictx != NULL)
- {
- DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
- free(sspictx);
- }
- FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
- pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
- _("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
- }
- /*
- * Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If
- * sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a
- * buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer
- * contents since the size does not change.
- */
- if (sspictx == NULL)
- {
- sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
- if (sspictx == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg("out of memory")));
- }
- memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
- if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
- elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
- } while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- /*
- * Release service principal credentials
- */
- FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
- /*
- * SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
- *
- * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
- * username that was specified for the connection.
- *
- * MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
- * secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
- */
- secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
- if (secur32 == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg_internal("could not load secur32.dll: error code %lu",
- GetLastError())));
- _QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
- GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
- if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
- {
- FreeLibrary(secur32);
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: error code %lu",
- GetLastError())));
- }
- r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
- if (r != SEC_E_OK)
- {
- FreeLibrary(secur32);
- pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
- _("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r);
- }
- FreeLibrary(secur32);
- /*
- * No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
- * token instead.
- */
- DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
- free(sspictx);
- if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg_internal("could not get token user size: error code %lu",
- GetLastError())));
- tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
- if (tokenuser == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg("out of memory")));
- if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg_internal("could not get user token: error code %lu",
- GetLastError())));
- if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
- domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu",
- GetLastError())));
- free(tokenuser);
- /*
- * Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
- * insensitive.
- */
- if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
- {
- if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0)
- {
- elog(DEBUG2,
- "SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
- domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- }
- /*
- * We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
- * the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
- *
- * If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
- */
- if (port->hba->include_realm)
- {
- char *namebuf;
- int retval;
- namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
- retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
- pfree(namebuf);
- return retval;
- }
- else
- return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
- }
- #endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * Ident authentication system
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- /*
- * Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
- * server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
- * and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
- * return false.
- */
- static bool
- interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
- char *ident_user)
- {
- const char *cursor = ident_response; /* Cursor into *ident_response */
- /*
- * Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
- */
- if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
- return false;
- else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
- return false;
- else
- {
- while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
- cursor++; /* skip port field */
- if (*cursor != ':')
- return false;
- else
- {
- /* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
- char response_type[80];
- int i; /* Index into *response_type */
- cursor++; /* Go over colon */
- while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
- cursor++; /* skip blanks */
- i = 0;
- while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) &&
- i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
- response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
- response_type[i] = '\0';
- while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
- cursor++; /* skip blanks */
- if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
- return false;
- else
- {
- /*
- * It's a USERID response. Good. "cursor" should be pointing
- * to the colon that precedes the operating system type.
- */
- if (*cursor != ':')
- return false;
- else
- {
- cursor++; /* Go over colon */
- /* Skip over operating system field. */
- while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
- cursor++;
- if (*cursor != ':')
- return false;
- else
- {
- int i; /* Index into *ident_user */
- cursor++; /* Go over colon */
- while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
- cursor++; /* skip blanks */
- /* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */
- i = 0;
- while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
- ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
- ident_user[i] = '\0';
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * Talk to the ident server on host "remote_ip_addr" and find out who
- * owns the tcp connection from his port "remote_port" to port
- * "local_port_addr" on host "local_ip_addr". Return the user name the
- * ident server gives as "*ident_user".
- *
- * IP addresses and port numbers are in network byte order.
- *
- * But iff we're unable to get the information from ident, return false.
- */
- static int
- ident_inet(hbaPort *port)
- {
- const SockAddr remote_addr = port->raddr;
- const SockAddr local_addr = port->laddr;
- char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
- pgsocket sock_fd; /* File descriptor for socket on which we talk
- * to Ident */
- int rc; /* Return code from a locally called function */
- bool ident_return;
- char remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
- char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
- char local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
- char local_port[NI_MAXSERV];
- char ident_port[NI_MAXSERV];
- char ident_query[80];
- char ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX];
- struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL,
- *la = NULL,
- hints;
- /*
- * Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to
- * sockaddr, but it's protocol independent.
- */
- pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen,
- remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s),
- remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
- NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
- pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen,
- local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s),
- local_port, sizeof(local_port),
- NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
- snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT);
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_protocol = 0;
- hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
- hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
- hints.ai_addr = NULL;
- hints.ai_next = NULL;
- rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv);
- if (rc || !ident_serv)
- {
- if (ident_serv)
- pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, ident_serv);
- return STATUS_ERROR; /* we don't expect this to happen */
- }
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- hints.ai_protocol = 0;
- hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
- hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
- hints.ai_addr = NULL;
- hints.ai_next = NULL;
- rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la);
- if (rc || !la)
- {
- if (la)
- pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, la);
- return STATUS_ERROR; /* we don't expect this to happen */
- }
- sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype,
- ident_serv->ai_protocol);
- if (sock_fd < 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m")));
- ident_return = false;
- goto ident_inet_done;
- }
- /*
- * Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise
- * the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This
- * is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias.
- */
- rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen);
- if (rc != 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m",
- local_addr_s)));
- ident_return = false;
- goto ident_inet_done;
- }
- rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr,
- ident_serv->ai_addrlen);
- if (rc != 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
- remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
- ident_return = false;
- goto ident_inet_done;
- }
- /* The query we send to the Ident server */
- snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n",
- remote_port, local_port);
- /* loop in case send is interrupted */
- do
- {
- rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0);
- } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
- if (rc < 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
- remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
- ident_return = false;
- goto ident_inet_done;
- }
- do
- {
- rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0);
- } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
- if (rc < 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
- remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
- ident_return = false;
- goto ident_inet_done;
- }
- ident_response[rc] = '\0';
- ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user);
- if (!ident_return)
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"",
- ident_response)));
- ident_inet_done:
- if (sock_fd >= 0)
- closesocket(sock_fd);
- pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv);
- pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la);
- if (ident_return)
- /* Success! Check the usermap */
- return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process,
- * determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user, and check
- * if valid per the usermap.
- *
- * Iff authorized, return STATUS_OK, otherwise return STATUS_ERROR.
- */
- #ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
- static int
- auth_peer(hbaPort *port)
- {
- char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
- struct passwd *pw;
- if (getpeereid(port->sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
- {
- /* Provide special error message if getpeereid is a stub */
- if (errno == ENOSYS)
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
- errmsg("peer authentication is not supported on this platform")));
- else
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode_for_socket_access(),
- errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- errno = 0; /* clear errno before call */
- pw = getpwuid(uid);
- if (!pw)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("failed to look up local user id %ld: %s",
- (long) uid, errno ? strerror(errno) : _("user does not exist"))));
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- strlcpy(ident_user, pw->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
- return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
- }
- #endif /* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
- /*----------------------------------------------------------------
- * PAM authentication system
- *----------------------------------------------------------------
- */
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- /*
- * PAM conversation function
- */
- static int
- pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
- struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr)
- {
- char *passwd;
- struct pam_response *reply;
- int i;
- if (appdata_ptr)
- passwd = (char *) appdata_ptr;
- else
- {
- /*
- * Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does
- * not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
- */
- passwd = pam_passwd;
- }
- *resp = NULL; /* in case of error exit */
- if (num_msg <= 0 || num_msg > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
- return PAM_CONV_ERR;
- /*
- * Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
- * pam_end()
- */
- if ((reply = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response))) == NULL)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("out of memory")));
- return PAM_CONV_ERR;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
- {
- switch (msg[i]->msg_style)
- {
- case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
- if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
- {
- /*
- * Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around -
- * let's go ask the client to send a password, which we
- * then stuff into PAM.
- */
- sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
- passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
- if (passwd == NULL)
- {
- /*
- * Client didn't want to send password. We
- * intentionally do not log anything about this.
- */
- goto fail;
- }
- if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(passwd)) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
- msg[i]->msg)));
- /* FALL THROUGH */
- case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- /* we don't bother to log TEXT_INFO messages */
- if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
- break;
- default:
- elog(LOG, "unsupported PAM conversation %d/\"%s\"",
- msg[i]->msg_style,
- msg[i]->msg ? msg[i]->msg : "(none)");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- *resp = reply;
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- fail:
- /* free up whatever we allocated */
- for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
- {
- if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
- free(reply[i].resp);
- }
- free(reply);
- return PAM_CONV_ERR;
- }
- /*
- * Check authentication against PAM.
- */
- static int
- CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
- {
- int retval;
- pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
- /*
- * We can't entirely rely on PAM to pass through appdata --- it appears
- * not to work on at least Solaris 2.6. So use these ugly static
- * variables instead.
- */
- pam_passwd = password;
- pam_port_cludge = port;
- /*
- * Set the application data portion of the conversation struct. This is
- * later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
- * authentication module.
- */
- pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = (char *) password; /* from password above,
- * not allocated */
- /* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
- if (port->hba->pamservice && port->hba->pamservice[0] != '\0')
- retval = pam_start(port->hba->pamservice, "pgsql@",
- &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
- else
- retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
- &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
- retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- {
- ereport(LOG,
- (errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
- pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
- }
- pam_passwd = NUL…
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