/src/backend/libpq/auth.c

Large files files are truncated, but you can click here to view the full file

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 *
 * auth.c
 *	  Routines to handle network authentication
 *
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
 *
 *
 * IDENTIFICATION
 *	  src/backend/libpq/auth.c
 *
 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 */

#include "postgres.h"

#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif

#include "commands/user.h"
#include "common/ip.h"
#include "common/md5.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "libpq/auth.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
#include "replication/walsender.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
#include "utils/timestamp.h"

/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Global authentication functions
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const char *extradata,
							int extralen);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail);
static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Password-based authentication methods (password, md5, and scram-sha-256)
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
static int	CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
static int	CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);

static int	CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail);
static int	CheckSCRAMAuth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail);


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Ident authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
/* Max size of username ident server can return (per RFC 1413) */
#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512

/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service.  Assigned by IANA */
#define IDENT_PORT 113

static int	ident_inet(hbaPort *port);


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Peer authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
static int	auth_peer(hbaPort *port);


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * PAM authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef USE_PAM
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#endif

#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql"	/* Service name passed to PAM */

static int	CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password);
static int	pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
								 struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr);

static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
	&pam_passwd_conv_proc,
	NULL
};

static const char *pam_passwd = NULL;	/* Workaround for Solaris 2.6
										 * brokenness */
static Port *pam_port_cludge;	/* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
								 * pam_passwd_conv_proc */
static bool pam_no_password;	/* For detecting no-password-given */
#endif							/* USE_PAM */


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * BSD authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
#include <bsd_auth.h>

static int	CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user);
#endif							/* USE_BSD_AUTH */


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * LDAP authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
#ifndef WIN32
/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
#include <ldap.h>
#else
#include <winldap.h>

/* Correct header from the Platform SDK */
typedef
ULONG		(*__ldap_start_tls_sA) (IN PLDAP ExternalHandle,
									OUT PULONG ServerReturnValue,
									OUT LDAPMessage **result,
									IN PLDAPControlA * ServerControls,
									IN PLDAPControlA * ClientControls
);
#endif

static int	CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);

/* LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE is the newer spelling */
#ifndef LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE
#define LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING
#endif

#endif							/* USE_LDAP */

/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Cert authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef USE_SSL
static int	CheckCertAuth(Port *port);
#endif


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
char	   *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
bool		pg_krb_caseins_users;


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * GSSAPI Authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"

static int	pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port);
static int	pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
#endif							/* ENABLE_GSS */


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * SSPI Authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
typedef SECURITY_STATUS
			(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (PCtxtHandle, void **);
static int	pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
static int	pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
							 size_t accountnamesize,
							 char *domainname,
							 size_t domainnamesize,
							 bool update_accountname);
#endif

/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * RADIUS Authentication
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
static int	CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
static int	PerformRadiusTransaction(const char *server, const char *secret, const char *portstr, const char *identifier, const char *user_name, const char *passwd);


/*
 * Maximum accepted size of GSS and SSPI authentication tokens.
 *
 * Kerberos tickets are usually quite small, but the TGTs issued by Windows
 * domain controllers include an authorization field known as the Privilege
 * Attribute Certificate (PAC), which contains the user's Windows permissions
 * (group memberships etc.). The PAC is copied into all tickets obtained on
 * the basis of this TGT (even those issued by Unix realms which the Windows
 * realm trusts), and can be several kB in size. The maximum token size
 * accepted by Windows systems is determined by the MaxAuthToken Windows
 * registry setting. Microsoft recommends that it is not set higher than
 * 65535 bytes, so that seems like a reasonable limit for us as well.
 */
#define PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH	65535

/*
 * Maximum accepted size of SASL messages.
 *
 * The messages that the server or libpq generate are much smaller than this,
 * but have some headroom.
 */
#define PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH	1024

/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Global authentication functions
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */

/*
 * This hook allows plugins to get control following client authentication,
 * but before the user has been informed about the results.  It could be used
 * to record login events, insert a delay after failed authentication, etc.
 */
ClientAuthentication_hook_type ClientAuthentication_hook = NULL;

/*
 * Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
 *
 * There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
 * unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users.  We would not, for example,
 * want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
 * But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
 * in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
 * anyway.
 * Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
 * postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.  In
 * particular, if logdetail isn't NULL, we send that string to the log.
 */
static void
auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail)
{
	const char *errstr;
	char	   *cdetail;
	int			errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION;

	/*
	 * If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
	 * trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
	 * the failure in the postmaster log.  (Logging the failure might be
	 * desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
	 * unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
	 * send.  We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
	 * password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
	 * events.)
	 */
	if (status == STATUS_EOF)
		proc_exit(0);

	switch (port->hba->auth_method)
	{
		case uaReject:
		case uaImplicitReject:
			errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
			break;
		case uaTrust:
			errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaIdent:
			errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaPeer:
			errstr = gettext_noop("Peer authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaPassword:
		case uaMD5:
		case uaSCRAM:
			errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			/* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
			errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
			break;
		case uaGSS:
			errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaSSPI:
			errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaPAM:
			errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaBSD:
			errstr = gettext_noop("BSD authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaLDAP:
			errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaCert:
			errstr = gettext_noop("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		case uaRADIUS:
			errstr = gettext_noop("RADIUS authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
			break;
		default:
			errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
			break;
	}

	cdetail = psprintf(_("Connection matched pg_hba.conf line %d: \"%s\""),
					   port->hba->linenumber, port->hba->rawline);
	if (logdetail)
		logdetail = psprintf("%s\n%s", logdetail, cdetail);
	else
		logdetail = cdetail;

	ereport(FATAL,
			(errcode(errcode_return),
			 errmsg(errstr, port->user_name),
			 logdetail ? errdetail_log("%s", logdetail) : 0));

	/* doesn't return */
}


/*
 * Client authentication starts here.  If there is an error, this
 * function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
 */
void
ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
{
	int			status = STATUS_ERROR;
	char	   *logdetail = NULL;

	/*
	 * Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
	 * combination.  Note: we do not parse the file at this point; this has
	 * already been done elsewhere.  hba.c dropped an error message into the
	 * server logfile if parsing the hba config file failed.
	 */
	hba_getauthmethod(port);

	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();

	/*
	 * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the
	 * current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba
	 * options field that should be done *before* the authentication here.
	 */
	if (port->hba->clientcert != clientCertOff)
	{
		/* If we haven't loaded a root certificate store, fail */
		if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())
			ereport(FATAL,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
					 errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available")));

		/*
		 * If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is
		 * present on the client, then it has been verified against our root
		 * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
		 * already if it didn't verify ok.
		 */
		if (!port->peer_cert_valid)
			ereport(FATAL,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
					 errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
	}

#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
	if (port->gss->enc && port->hba->auth_method != uaReject &&
		port->hba->auth_method != uaImplicitReject &&
		port->hba->auth_method != uaTrust &&
		port->hba->auth_method != uaGSS)
	{
		ereport(FATAL, (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
						errmsg("GSSAPI encryption can only be used with gss, trust, or reject authentication methods")));
	}
#endif

	/*
	 * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
	 */
	switch (port->hba->auth_method)
	{
		case uaReject:

			/*
			 * An explicit "reject" entry in pg_hba.conf.  This report exposes
			 * the fact that there's an explicit reject entry, which is
			 * perhaps not so desirable from a security standpoint; but the
			 * message for an implicit reject could confuse the DBA a lot when
			 * the true situation is a match to an explicit reject.  And we
			 * don't want to change the message for an implicit reject.  As
			 * noted below, the additional information shown here doesn't
			 * expose anything not known to an attacker.
			 */
			{
				char		hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];

				pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
								   hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
								   NULL, 0,
								   NI_NUMERICHOST);

				if (am_walsender)
				{
#ifdef USE_SSL
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
#else
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\"",
									hostinfo, port->user_name)));
#endif
				}
				else
				{
#ifdef USE_SSL
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->database_name,
									port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
#else
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->database_name)));
#endif
				}
				break;
			}

		case uaImplicitReject:

			/*
			 * No matching entry, so tell the user we fell through.
			 *
			 * NOTE: the extra info reported here is not a security breach,
			 * because all that info is known at the frontend and must be
			 * assumed known to bad guys.  We're merely helping out the less
			 * clueful good guys.
			 */
			{
				char		hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];

				pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
								   hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
								   NULL, 0,
								   NI_NUMERICHOST);

#define HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port) \
				(port->remote_hostname ? \
				 (port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1 ? \
				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup matches.", \
								port->remote_hostname) : \
				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == 0 ? \
				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup not checked.", \
								port->remote_hostname) : \
				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == -1 ? \
				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup does not match.", \
								port->remote_hostname) : \
				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
				  errdetail_log("Could not translate client host name \"%s\" to IP address: %s.", \
								port->remote_hostname, \
								gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
				  0) \
				 : (port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
					errdetail_log("Could not resolve client IP address to a host name: %s.", \
								  gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
					0))

				if (am_walsender)
				{
#ifdef USE_SSL
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off")),
							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
#else
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\"",
									hostinfo, port->user_name),
							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
#endif
				}
				else
				{
#ifdef USE_SSL
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->database_name,
									port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off")),
							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
#else
					ereport(FATAL,
							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
									hostinfo, port->user_name,
									port->database_name),
							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
#endif
				}
				break;
			}

		case uaGSS:
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
			port->gss->auth = true;
			if (port->gss->enc)
				status = pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
			else
			{
				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS, NULL, 0);
				status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
			}
#else
			Assert(false);
#endif
			break;

		case uaSSPI:
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI, NULL, 0);
			status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
#else
			Assert(false);
#endif
			break;

		case uaPeer:
			status = auth_peer(port);
			break;

		case uaIdent:
			status = ident_inet(port);
			break;

		case uaMD5:
		case uaSCRAM:
			status = CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, &logdetail);
			break;

		case uaPassword:
			status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
			break;

		case uaPAM:
#ifdef USE_PAM
			status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
#else
			Assert(false);
#endif							/* USE_PAM */
			break;

		case uaBSD:
#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
			status = CheckBSDAuth(port, port->user_name);
#else
			Assert(false);
#endif							/* USE_BSD_AUTH */
			break;

		case uaLDAP:
#ifdef USE_LDAP
			status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
#else
			Assert(false);
#endif
			break;
		case uaRADIUS:
			status = CheckRADIUSAuth(port);
			break;
		case uaCert:
			/* uaCert will be treated as if clientcert=verify-full (uaTrust) */
		case uaTrust:
			status = STATUS_OK;
			break;
	}

	if ((status == STATUS_OK && port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull)
		|| port->hba->auth_method == uaCert)
	{
		/*
		 * Make sure we only check the certificate if we use the cert method
		 * or verify-full option.
		 */
#ifdef USE_SSL
		status = CheckCertAuth(port);
#else
		Assert(false);
#endif
	}

	if (ClientAuthentication_hook)
		(*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status);

	if (status == STATUS_OK)
		sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0);
	else
		auth_failed(port, status, logdetail);
}


/*
 * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
 */
static void
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const char *extradata, int extralen)
{
	StringInfoData buf;

	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();

	pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
	pq_sendint32(&buf, (int32) areq);
	if (extralen > 0)
		pq_sendbytes(&buf, extradata, extralen);

	pq_endmessage(&buf);

	/*
	 * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK and
	 * AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, which need not be sent until we are ready for
	 * queries.
	 */
	if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK && areq != AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN)
		pq_flush();

	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
}

/*
 * Collect password response packet from frontend.
 *
 * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
 */
static char *
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
{
	StringInfoData buf;

	pq_startmsgread();
	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
	{
		/* Expect 'p' message type */
		int			mtype;

		mtype = pq_getbyte();
		if (mtype != 'p')
		{
			/*
			 * If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
			 * don't make a log entry.  This is legal per protocol spec and in
			 * fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
			 * log.
			 */
			if (mtype != EOF)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
								mtype)));
			return NULL;		/* EOF or bad message type */
		}
	}
	else
	{
		/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
		if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
			return NULL;		/* EOF */
	}

	initStringInfo(&buf);
	if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000))	/* receive password */
	{
		/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
		pfree(buf.data);
		return NULL;
	}

	/*
	 * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
	 * contained string.  Note it is safe to use strlen here because
	 * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
	 */
	if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("invalid password packet size")));

	/*
	 * Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the same
	 * as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But other
	 * clients might, so allowing it would be confusing.
	 *
	 * Note that this only catches an empty password sent by the client in
	 * plaintext. There's also a check in CREATE/ALTER USER that prevents an
	 * empty string from being stored as a user's password in the first place.
	 * We rely on that for MD5 and SCRAM authentication, but we still need
	 * this check here, to prevent an empty password from being used with
	 * authentication methods that check the password against an external
	 * system, like PAM, LDAP and RADIUS.
	 */
	if (buf.len == 1)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD),
				 errmsg("empty password returned by client")));

	/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
	elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet");

	/*
	 * Return the received string.  Note we do not attempt to do any
	 * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
	 * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
	 */
	return buf.data;
}


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Password-based authentication mechanisms
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */

/*
 * Plaintext password authentication.
 */
static int
CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
	char	   *passwd;
	int			result;
	char	   *shadow_pass;

	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);

	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
	if (passwd == NULL)
		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */

	shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);
	if (shadow_pass)
	{
		result = plain_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
									logdetail);
	}
	else
		result = STATUS_ERROR;

	if (shadow_pass)
		pfree(shadow_pass);
	pfree(passwd);

	return result;
}

/*
 * MD5 and SCRAM authentication.
 */
static int
CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
	int			auth_result;
	char	   *shadow_pass;
	PasswordType pwtype;

	Assert(port->hba->auth_method == uaSCRAM ||
		   port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5);

	/* First look up the user's password. */
	shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);

	/*
	 * If the user does not exist, or has no password or it's expired, we
	 * still go through the motions of authentication, to avoid revealing to
	 * the client that the user didn't exist.  If 'md5' is allowed, we choose
	 * whether to use 'md5' or 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on current
	 * password_encryption setting.  The idea is that most genuine users
	 * probably have a password of that type, and if we pretend that this user
	 * had a password of that type, too, it "blends in" best.
	 */
	if (!shadow_pass)
		pwtype = Password_encryption;
	else
		pwtype = get_password_type(shadow_pass);

	/*
	 * If 'md5' authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform 'md5' or
	 * 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on the type of password the user
	 * has.  If it's an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if it's a
	 * SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication.
	 *
	 * If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM.  If the user
	 * had an MD5 password, CheckSCRAMAuth() will fail.
	 */
	if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5 && pwtype == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
		auth_result = CheckMD5Auth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);
	else
		auth_result = CheckSCRAMAuth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);

	if (shadow_pass)
		pfree(shadow_pass);

	/*
	 * If get_role_password() returned error, return error, even if the
	 * authentication succeeded.
	 */
	if (!shadow_pass)
	{
		Assert(auth_result != STATUS_OK);
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}
	return auth_result;
}

static int
CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail)
{
	char		md5Salt[4];		/* Password salt */
	char	   *passwd;
	int			result;

	if (Db_user_namespace)
		ereport(FATAL,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
				 errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled")));

	/* include the salt to use for computing the response */
	if (!pg_strong_random(md5Salt, 4))
	{
		ereport(LOG,
				(errmsg("could not generate random MD5 salt")));
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4);

	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
	if (passwd == NULL)
		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */

	if (shadow_pass)
		result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
								  md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
	else
		result = STATUS_ERROR;

	pfree(passwd);

	return result;
}

static int
CheckSCRAMAuth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail)
{
	StringInfoData sasl_mechs;
	int			mtype;
	StringInfoData buf;
	void	   *scram_opaq = NULL;
	char	   *output = NULL;
	int			outputlen = 0;
	const char *input;
	int			inputlen;
	int			result;
	bool		initial;

	/*
	 * SASL auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SASL payload
	 * size in AuthenticationSASLContinue and PasswordMessage messages.  (We
	 * used to have a hard rule that protocol messages must be parsable
	 * without relying on the length word, but we hardly care about older
	 * protocol version anymore.)
	 */
	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
		ereport(FATAL,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
				 errmsg("SASL authentication is not supported in protocol version 2")));

	/*
	 * Send the SASL authentication request to user.  It includes the list of
	 * authentication mechanisms that are supported.
	 */
	initStringInfo(&sasl_mechs);

	pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms(port, &sasl_mechs);
	/* Put another '\0' to mark that list is finished. */
	appendStringInfoChar(&sasl_mechs, '\0');

	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, sasl_mechs.data, sasl_mechs.len);
	pfree(sasl_mechs.data);

	/*
	 * Loop through SASL message exchange.  This exchange can consist of
	 * multiple messages sent in both directions.  First message is always
	 * from the client.  All messages from client to server are password
	 * packets (type 'p').
	 */
	initial = true;
	do
	{
		pq_startmsgread();
		mtype = pq_getbyte();
		if (mtype != 'p')
		{
			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
			if (mtype != EOF)
			{
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("expected SASL response, got message type %d",
								mtype)));
			}
			else
				return STATUS_EOF;
		}

		/* Get the actual SASL message */
		initStringInfo(&buf);
		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH))
		{
			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
			pfree(buf.data);
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SASL response of length %d", buf.len);

		/*
		 * The first SASLInitialResponse message is different from the others.
		 * It indicates which SASL mechanism the client selected, and contains
		 * an optional Initial Client Response payload.  The subsequent
		 * SASLResponse messages contain just the SASL payload.
		 */
		if (initial)
		{
			const char *selected_mech;

			selected_mech = pq_getmsgrawstring(&buf);

			/*
			 * Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges.
			 *
			 * If the user doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid password, or
			 * it's expired, we still go through the motions of SASL
			 * authentication, but tell the authentication method that the
			 * authentication is "doomed". That is, it's going to fail, no
			 * matter what.
			 *
			 * This is because we don't want to reveal to an attacker what
			 * usernames are valid, nor which users have a valid password.
			 */
			scram_opaq = pg_be_scram_init(port, selected_mech, shadow_pass);

			inputlen = pq_getmsgint(&buf, 4);
			if (inputlen == -1)
				input = NULL;
			else
				input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, inputlen);

			initial = false;
		}
		else
		{
			inputlen = buf.len;
			input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, buf.len);
		}
		pq_getmsgend(&buf);

		/*
		 * The StringInfo guarantees that there's a \0 byte after the
		 * response.
		 */
		Assert(input == NULL || input[inputlen] == '\0');

		/*
		 * we pass 'logdetail' as NULL when doing a mock authentication,
		 * because we should already have a better error message in that case
		 */
		result = pg_be_scram_exchange(scram_opaq, input, inputlen,
									  &output, &outputlen,
									  logdetail);

		/* input buffer no longer used */
		pfree(buf.data);

		if (output)
		{
			/*
			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
			 */
			elog(DEBUG4, "sending SASL challenge of length %u", outputlen);

			if (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, output, outputlen);
			else
				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);

			pfree(output);
		}
	} while (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);

	/* Oops, Something bad happened */
	if (result != SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
	{
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	return STATUS_OK;
}


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * GSSAPI authentication system
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
static int
pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
{
	OM_uint32	maj_stat,
				min_stat,
				lmin_s,
				gflags;
	int			mtype;
	StringInfoData buf;
	gss_buffer_desc gbuf;

	/*
	 * GSS auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the GSS payload
	 * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
	 * is, in fact, a design error in our GSS support, because protocol
	 * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
	 * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
	 */
	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
		ereport(FATAL,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
				 errmsg("GSSAPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));

	if (pg_krb_server_keyfile && strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) > 0)
	{
		/*
		 * Set default Kerberos keytab file for the Krb5 mechanism.
		 *
		 * setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 0); except setenv()
		 * not always available.
		 */
		if (getenv("KRB5_KTNAME") == NULL)
		{
			size_t		kt_len = strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) + 14;
			char	   *kt_path = malloc(kt_len);

			if (!kt_path ||
				snprintf(kt_path, kt_len, "KRB5_KTNAME=%s",
						 pg_krb_server_keyfile) != kt_len - 2 ||
				putenv(kt_path) != 0)
			{
				ereport(LOG,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
						 errmsg("out of memory")));
				return STATUS_ERROR;
			}
		}
	}

	/*
	 * We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
	 * increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
	 * for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
	 * any vector of attack.
	 */
	port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;

	/*
	 * Initialize sequence with an empty context
	 */
	port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;

	/*
	 * Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
	 * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
	 * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
	 * (type 'p').
	 */
	do
	{
		pq_startmsgread();

		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();

		mtype = pq_getbyte();
		if (mtype != 'p')
		{
			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
			if (mtype != EOF)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
								mtype)));
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		/* Get the actual GSS token */
		initStringInfo(&buf);
		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
		{
			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
			pfree(buf.data);
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		/* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
		gbuf.length = buf.len;
		gbuf.value = buf.data;

		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received GSS token of length %u",
			 (unsigned int) gbuf.length);

		maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
										  &port->gss->ctx,
										  port->gss->cred,
										  &gbuf,
										  GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
										  &port->gss->name,
										  NULL,
										  &port->gss->outbuf,
										  &gflags,
										  NULL,
										  NULL);

		/* gbuf no longer used */
		pfree(buf.data);

		elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %d, "
			 "minor: %d, outlen: %u, outflags: %x",
			 maj_stat, min_stat,
			 (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);

		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();

		if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
		{
			/*
			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
			 */
			elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u",
				 (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);

			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
							port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);

			gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
		}

		if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
		{
			gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
			pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
						 _("accepting GSS security context failed"),
						 maj_stat, min_stat);
		}

		if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
			elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");

	} while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);

	if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
	{
		/*
		 * Release service principal credentials
		 */
		gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
	}
	return pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
}

/*
 * Check whether the GSSAPI-authenticated user is allowed to connect as the
 * claimed username.
 */
static int
pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port)
{
	int			ret;
	OM_uint32	maj_stat,
				min_stat,
				lmin_s;
	gss_buffer_desc gbuf;

	/*
	 * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
	 * username that was specified for the connection.
	 */
	maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
		pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
					 _("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
					 maj_stat, min_stat);

	/*
	 * Copy the original name of the authenticated principal into our backend
	 * memory for display later.
	 */
	port->gss->princ = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, gbuf.value);

	/*
	 * Split the username at the realm separator
	 */
	if (strchr(gbuf.value, '@'))
	{
		char	   *cp = strchr(gbuf.value, '@');

		/*
		 * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is
		 * passed to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the
		 * realm. Then advance past the separator to check the realm.
		 */
		if (!port->hba->include_realm)
			*cp = '\0';
		cp++;

		if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
		{
			/*
			 * Match the realm part of the name first
			 */
			if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
				ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
			else
				ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);

			if (ret)
			{
				/* GSS realm does not match */
				elog(DEBUG2,
					 "GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
					 cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
				gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
				return STATUS_ERROR;
			}
		}
	}
	else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
	{
		elog(DEBUG2,
			 "GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");

		gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, gbuf.value,
						pg_krb_caseins_users);

	gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);

	return ret;
}
#endif							/* ENABLE_GSS */


/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * SSPI authentication system
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI

/*
 * Generate an error for SSPI authentication.  The caller should apply
 * _() to errmsg to make it translatable.
 */
static void
pg_SSPI_error(int severity, const char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
{
	char		sysmsg[256];

	if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS |
					  FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
					  NULL, r, 0,
					  sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
		ereport(severity,
				(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
				 errdetail_internal("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
	else
		ereport(severity,
				(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
				 errdetail_internal("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
}

static int
pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
{
	int			mtype;
	StringInfoData buf;
	SECURITY_STATUS r;
	CredHandle	sspicred;
	CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
				newctx;
	TimeStamp	expiry;
	ULONG		contextattr;
	SecBufferDesc inbuf;
	SecBufferDesc outbuf;
	SecBuffer	OutBuffers[1];
	SecBuffer	InBuffers[1];
	HANDLE		token;
	TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
	DWORD		retlen;
	char		accountname[MAXPGPATH];
	char		domainname[MAXPGPATH];
	DWORD		accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
	DWORD		domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
	SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
	HMODULE		secur32;

	QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;

	/*
	 * SSPI auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SSPI payload
	 * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
	 * is, in fact, a design error in our SSPI support, because protocol
	 * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
	 * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
	 */
	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
		ereport(FATAL,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
				 errmsg("SSPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));

	/*
	 * Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
	 */
	r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
								 "negotiate",
								 SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
								 NULL,
								 NULL,
								 NULL,
								 NULL,
								 &sspicred,
								 &expiry);
	if (r != SEC_E_OK)
		pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r);

	/*
	 * Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
	 * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
	 * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
	 * (type 'p').
	 */
	do
	{
		pq_startmsgread();
		mtype = pq_getbyte();
		if (mtype != 'p')
		{
			if (sspictx != NULL)
			{
				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
				free(sspictx);
			}
			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);

			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
			if (mtype != EOF)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
								mtype)));
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		/* Get the actual SSPI token */
		initStringInfo(&buf);
		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
		{
			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
			pfree(buf.data);
			if (sspictx != NULL)
			{
				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
				free(sspictx);
			}
			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		/* Map to SSPI style buffer */
		inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
		inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
		inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
		InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
		InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
		InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;

		/* Prepare output buffer */
		OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
		OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
		OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
		outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
		outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
		outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;

		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SSPI token of length %u",
			 (unsigned int) buf.len);

		r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
								  sspictx,
								  &inbuf,
								  ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
								  SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
								  &newctx,
								  &outbuf,
								  &contextattr,
								  NULL);

		/* input buffer no longer used */
		pfree(buf.data);

		if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
		{
			/*
			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
			 */
			elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
				 (unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);

			port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
			port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;

			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
							port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);

			FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
		}

		if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
		{
			if (sspictx != NULL)
			{
				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
				free(sspictx);
			}
			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
			pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
						  _("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
		}

		/*
		 * Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If
		 * sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a
		 * buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer
		 * contents since the size does not change.
		 */
		if (sspictx == NULL)
		{
			sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
			if (sspictx == NULL)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errmsg("out of memory")));
		}

		memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));

		if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
			elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");

	} while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);


	/*
	 * Release service principal credentials
	 */
	FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);


	/*
	 * SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
	 *
	 * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
	 * username that was specified for the connection.
	 *
	 * MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
	 * secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
	 */

	secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
	if (secur32 == NULL)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg("could not load library \"%s\": error code %lu",
						"SECUR32.DLL", GetLastError())));

	_QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
		GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
	if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
	{
		FreeLibrary(secur32);
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: error code %lu",
								 GetLastError())));
	}

	r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
	if (r != SEC_E_OK)
	{
		FreeLibrary(secur32);
		pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
					  _("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r);
	}

	FreeLibrary(secur32);

	/*
	 * No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
	 * token instead.
	 */
	DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
	free(sspictx);

	if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg_internal("could not get token information buffer size: error code %lu",
								 GetLastError())));

	tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
	if (tokenuser == NULL)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg("out of memory")));

	if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg_internal("could not get token information: error code %lu",
								 GetLastError())));

	CloseHandle(token);

	if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
						  domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu",
								 GetLastError())));

	free(tokenuser);

	if (!port->hba->compat_realm)
	{
		int			status = pg_SSPI_make_upn(accountname, sizeof(accountname),
											  domainname, sizeof(domainname),
											  port->hba->upn_username);

		if (status != STATUS_OK)
			/* Error already reported from pg_SSPI_make_upn */
			return status;
	}

	/*
	 * Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
	 * insensitive.
	 */
	if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
	{
		if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0)
		{
			elog(DEBUG2,
				 "SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
				 domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);

			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
	 * the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
	 *
	 * If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
	 */
	if (port->hba->include_realm)
	{
		char	   *namebuf;
		int			retval;

		namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
		retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
		pfree(namebuf);
		return retval;
	}
	else
		return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
}

/*
 * Replaces the domainname with the Kerberos realm name,
 * and optionally the accountname with the Kerberos user name.
 */
static int
pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
				 size_t accountnamesize,
				 char *domainname,
				 size_t domainnamesize,
				 bool update_accountname)
{
	char	   *samname;
	char	   *upname = NULL;
	char	   *p = NULL;
	ULONG		upnamesize = 0;
	size_t		upnamerealmsize;
	BOOLEAN		res;

	/*
	 * Build SAM name (DOMAIN\user), then translate to UPN
	 * (user@kerberos.realm). The realm name is returned in lower case, but
	 * that is fine because in SSPI auth, string comparisons are always
	 * case-insensitive.
	 */

	samname = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname);
	res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
						NULL, &upnamesize);

	if ((!res && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
		|| upnamesize == 0)
	{
		pfree(samname);
		ereport(LOG,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
				 errmsg("could not translate name")));
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	/* upnamesize includes the terminating NUL. */
	upname = palloc(upnamesize);

	res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
						upname, &upnamesize);

	pfree(samname);
	if (res)
		p = strchr(upname, '@');

	if (!res || p == NULL)
	{
		pfree(upname);
		ereport(LOG,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
				 errmsg("could not translate name")));
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	/* Length of realm name after the '@', including the NUL. */
	upnamerealmsize = upnamesize - (p - upname + 1);

	/* Replace domainname with realm name. */
	if (upnamerealmsize > domainnamesize)
	{
		pfree(upname);
		ereport(LOG,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
				 errmsg("realm name too long")));
		return STATUS_ERROR;
	}

	/* Length is now safe. */
	strcpy(domainname, p + 1);

	/* Replace account name as well (in case UPN != SAM)? */
	if (update_accountname)
	{
		if ((p - upname + 1) > accountnamesize)
		{
			pfree(upname);
			ereport(LOG,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
					 errmsg("translated account name too long")));
			return STATUS_ERROR;
		}

		*p = 0;
		strcpy(accountname, upname);
	}

	pfree(upname);
	return STATUS_OK;
}
#endif							/* ENABLE_SSPI */



/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 * Ident authentication system
 *----------------------------------------------------------------
 */

/*
 *	Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
 *	server.  If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
 *	and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
 *	return false.
 */
static bool
interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
						 char *ident_user)
{
	const char *cursor = ident_response;	/* Cursor into *ident_response */

	/*
	 * Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
	 */
	if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
		return false;
	else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
		return false;
	else
	{
		while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
			cursor++;			/* skip port field */

		if (*cursor != ':')
			return false;
		else
		{
			/* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
			char		response_type[80];
			int			i;		/* Index into *response_type */

			cursor++;			/* Go over colon */
			while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
				cursor++;		/* skip blanks */
			i = 0;
			while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) &&
				   i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
				response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
			response_type[i] = '\0';
			while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
				cursor++;		/* skip blanks */
			if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
				return false;
			else
			{
				/*
				 * It's a USERID response.  Good.  "cursor" should be pointing
				 * to the colon that p…